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Abstract. Internet search (or perhaps more accurately ‘web-search’) has grown
exponentially over the last decade at an even more rapid rate than the Internet
itself. Starting from nothing in the 1990s, today search is a multi-billion dollar
business. Search engine providers such as Google and Yahoo! have become house-
hold names, and the use of a search engine, like use of the Web, is now a part of
everyday life. The rapid growth of online search and its growing centrality to the
ecology of the Internet raise a variety of questions for economists to answer. Why
is the search engine market so concentrated and will it evolve towards monop-
oly? What are the implications of this concentration for different ‘participants’
(consumers, search engines, advertisers)? Does the fact that search engines act as
‘information gatekeepers’, determining, in effect, what can be found on the web,
mean that search deserves particularly close attention from policy-makers? This
paper supplies empirical and theoretical material with which to examine many of
these questions. In particular, we (a) show that the already large levels of concen-
tration are likely to continue (b) identify the consequences, negative and positive,
of this outcome (c) discuss the possible regulatory interventions that policy-makers
could utilize to address these.
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1. Introduction
Internet search (or perhaps more accurately ‘web-search’) has grown enormously
in recent years, rising in line, or even faster, than the general development of the
Internet and the World-Wide-Web.1 Beginning from practically nothing twelve years
ago, today search is a multi-billion dollar business. Search engine providers such as
Google and Yahoo! have become household names2 and use of a search engine, like
use of the Web, is now a part of everyday life.
As the amount of information pouring onto the web has grown, the utility, impor-
tance, and power of search engines has grown concomitantly: with ever more infor-
mation available, a user is faced with finding a ‘needle’ in an ever larger ‘haystack’ –
and has therefore become ever more dependent on the filtering facilities provided by
search engines. With this process of information accumulation showing little sign
of slowing, let alone stopping, the continued growth of search engines, and their
importance, seems assured.
Apart from its wider societal importance there are several noteworthy features of
the search engine business. Most importantly, the fact that users (almost always)
do not pay – that is to say, the service provided by web search engines are free
(to use).3 Where then do web search engines find their revenue? In one word:
advertising. When search engines provide ordinary users with a ‘free’ service they
gain something very valuable in exchange: attention. Attention is a rival good, and
one in strictly limited supply – after all each of us have a maximum of 24 hours
of attention available in any one day (and usually much, much less). Access to
that attention is correspondingly valuable – and is likely to become ever more so
1It is important to remember that while the World-Wide-Web traffic now represents one of the
largest sources of Internet traffic it is by no means the only one.
2It should be noted that while Google has been almost entirely search-focused throughout its
existence the same is not true of Yahoo! which has long positioned itself as a web ‘portal’, devoting
substantially less attention to its search business.
3We make this qualification because of the term ‘free’ particularly in the context of ‘free software’
or even, increasingly, ‘free’ services denotes something which is both ‘free’ to use but also which
one is ‘free’ to copy and modify. Here, for clarity, where such a distinction needs to be drawn we
will usually talk of an ‘open service’ or an ‘open system’.
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– especially for those who have products or services to advertise. Thus, while web
search engines do not charge users, they can retail the attention generated by their
service to those are willing to pay for access to it. In so doing such companies have
built multi-billion dollar businesses.
It is also now noteworthy, that the skills and resources acquired in developing the
basic search engine, particularly the skills in optimizing the selection of advertising
to show, are now proving valuable outside of their original context. For example, by
quarter two 2007, 35% of Google’s total revenue ($1.35 billion) came from provision
of advertising on 3rd party sites via its Adsense programme while 64% ($2.49 billion)
of its revenue came from sites it owned and operated.4 Similarly, in the same time
period, 35% of Yahoo’s total revenue ($599 million of $1,698 million) came from
affiliates while just over 52% of its revenue ($887 million) came from sites it owns
and operates.5
Another major feature of the search engine market is its high levels of concentra-
tion. As of August 2007 the top four search engines had a combined market share
97% in the US with the top firm (Google) having 65%.6
The rapid growth of online search, its concentration and its growing centrality to
information society raise a host of questions for economists to answer. Why is the
search engine market so concentrated? Will concentration increase or decrease over
time, and will a single firm come to dominate the market? What are the implications
for different ‘players’ (consumers, search engines, advertisers) both under the current
market structure and under its likely future evolution? Does the fact that search
engines act as ‘information gatekeepers’, determining, in effect, what can be found
on the web, mean that there may be need for regulation quite apart from standard
4See http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/revenues_q207.html, visited 2007-09-
24.
5Yahoo! Q2 2007 Earnings release available online at: http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/
results.cfm
6Concentration in other markets was if anything even higher. For example in the UK Google held
79% market share as of August 2007. More details on market shares and their changes over time
are in Section 3 available below.
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commercial and welfare considerations. Finally, what issues does the search market
raise for antitrust/competition policy? Specifically does the search market require
regulation, and, if so, in what form?7
This article addresses many of these questions. It also provides a basic review
of some of the existing literature, general, empirical and theoretical, related to web
search. In particular we supply a brief history, empirical data on the current sit-
uation and likely future trends, and a formal model with which to understand the
functioning and welfare implications of the web search market.
2. A Brief History of Web Search
The history of web search is inextricably bound up with the development of the
world wide web. We therefore begin with a brief sketch that outlines the nature and
history of the Web before turning to the question of search.
2.1. The World-Wide-Web. The World Wide Web is a hypertext system that
has been adopted as the main method of information dissemination on the Internet.
The element central to the Web - and any universal information system - was the
creation of the Universal or Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), a method of uniquely
assigning a name or address to any document or resource (for example a database)
anywhere in the world. To most people this takes on the form of a URL, a Uniform
Resource Locator, familiar as the ubiquitous www.somename.com. This in turn
allowed at last a concrete implementation of hypertext, a method of inserting active
links to other documents first conceived of by Vannevar Bush in the 1940s and
elaborated by Ted Nelson in the form of his Xanadu project, and the feature which
truly makes the Web a ‘web’. In many ways the great achievement of the Web has
not been technical, but social: persuading a large number of different groups each
7Additionally web search provides a fascinating case study for a student of technology and inno-
vation. After all web search is clearly a new product, and one which is developing and evolving
rapidly, with very large R&D spends by the major players.
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with their own standards and interests to agree to the formation of this one universal
system.8
The Web, though built upon much previous work, was at its initial stage largely
the creation of one man: Tim Berners-Lee. Berners-Lee was born in London and
educated at the Emanuel School and Queen’s College, Oxford, from which he gradu-
ated with a first in Physics in 1976. Both his parents were mathematicians and had
worked on the team that programmed the world’s first commercial stored-program
computer, the Manchester University ‘Mark 1’. While at Oxford he built his own
computer using a soldering iron, an M6800 processor and an old television, and on
leaving he became a software engineer, first with Plessey Communications, and then
with D.G. Nash. In 1980 he went to CERN as a consultant for a six month period.
While there in his spare time he wrote a program called Enquire in which he first
used hypertext links to allow navigation.
In 1984 he returned to CERN to work on data acquisition and control. As com-
puters and the internet evolved during the 1980s Berners-Lee became ever more
interested in developing a system that would allow information to be both created
and shared in a universal format and would also support a hypertext system - a
crucial aspect he believed of building a true ‘web of knowledge’. In March 1989
he wrote his first proposal for a global hypertext system but it was not until May
1990 that he was authorized to pursue the project and settled upon the name World
Wide Web (after considering others such as Information Mesh or The Information
Mine). Writing initially for the NeXT system, Berners-Lee quickly produced a Web
client or browser that would allow a user to create, edit or browse hypertext pages
and which he named simply WorldWideWeb. He also produced a Web server which
would store the pages and serve them up to the user as they were requested. In
8It is important to remember that when the Web first arrived it was only one among several
competing alternatives and by no means the preeminent option. In particular, in the early 1990s,
when the Web was launched both Gopher and WAIS performed similar functions and a work such
as Ed Krol’s The Whole Internet User’s Guide & Catalog (published in 1992) clearly put these,
more established protocols, above the newly arrived ‘World Wide Web’.
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doing this he settled upon the basic standards which have continued to underlie the
system to the present day, namely HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol), HTML
(HyperText Markup Language) and URI (Universal Resource Identifier). By Christ-
mas Day 1990 Berners-Lee and his colleague Cailliau had set up the first website
named info.cern.ch and had transferred the first web pages over the internet.
Despite these advances, at this point there were no signs of the Web’s huge future
success but only difficulties. Paramount among these, was the problem of persuading
users at CERN, each with their own computer system and way of doing things,
to adopt the new approach. As Berners-Lee later wrote, “there was a constant
background of of people promoting ideas for new software systems. CERN obviously
couldn’t tolerate everybody creating unique software for every function. Robert
and I had to distinguish our idea as novel, and one that would allow CERN to
leap forward. Rather than parade in with our new system for cosmic sharing of
information, we decided to try to persuade people that we were offering them a way
to extend their existing documentation system. This was a concrete and promising
notion. We could later get them to sign on to the dream of global hypertext.”9
Finding it difficult to persuade CERN of the importance of the new system
Berners-Lee decided to release it outside CERN, and in August 1991 he released it
on the Internet, posting notices in several Internet forums including alt.hypertext.
Web sites began to appear all over the world, and initially Berners-Lee would add
a link to each one onto info.cern.ch. By measuring the number of ‘hits’ or page
views of info.cern.ch Berners-Lee could monitor the early progress of the web. In
July and August 1991 there were between 10 and 100 ‘hits’ a day. As Berners-Lee
later wrote: “This was slow progress, but encouraging. I’ve compared the effort to
launch the Web to that required to launch a bobsleigh: everyone has to push hard
for a seemingly long time, but sooner or later the sleigh is off on its own momentum
and everyone jumps in.”10
9Berners-Lee (1999), p. 47.
10Berners-Lee (1999), p.54
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At this point progress began to take place more and more rapidly. First and fore-
most, browsers (software that would allow the use to access and view Web pages)
were developed for many different platforms: Unix (Erwise 1991, ViolaWWW 1992
and Mosaic 1993), Apple (Samba 1992-3, Mosaic 1993) and later PC (Cello and
Mosaic 1993). Since then most of these early ‘open’ browsers have been superseded
by ‘free’ commercial products such as Navigator (Netscape), Internet Explorer (Mi-
crosoft), and Firefox (Netscape/Mozilla Foundation) though it is noteworthy that
the creators of Navigator had also made Mosaic. Second, in a step that was to
prove crucial to the long term direction and development of the Web, in April 1993
Berners-Lee persuaded CERN, who as his employers owned the intellectual prop-
erty rights to his work, to put everything relating to the Web in the public domain.
‘Hits’ on info.cern.ch grew exponentially from the beginning. By summer 1992 the
number had reached one thousand and by summer 1993 ten thousand: “I no longer
had to push the bobsleigh. It was time to jump in and steer” said Berners-Lee.11
2.2. Web Search Engines. As the Web’s exponential growth commenced in the
early 1990s users began to confront the issue of finding what they wanted in a rapidly
expanding sea of information. At the very beginning it was feasible for Berners-Lee
simply to add a link to a new ‘web-site’ to info.cern.ch but as the web grew such an
approach rapidly became impractical – between 1993 and 1996 the web went from
130 sites to 600,000. Some way had to be found to crawl, index and search the web
in a way that could cope with this exponential growth in material.12
Table 1 below, details the history of the main early Internet search engines. As
it shows, much of the very early work, focused simply on ‘crawling’, compiling a list
(the index) of the resources available. However, soon the quantity of material led
11Berners-Lee (1999), p.81
12This chapter focuses on the web and therefore has excluded some earlier search engines such as
‘Archie’ and ‘Veronica’. ‘Archie’ was created by Alan Emtage, a McGill University student, in
1990 and indexed Internet ftp archives. ‘Veronica’ was created in 1993 by University of Nevada
students and did the same thing as ‘Archie’ but for ‘Gopher’ archives.
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to attention to the problem of presenting the material via querying and ranking of
the index.
Date System Creator Details
1993 WWW
Wanderer
Matthew Gay
(MIT)
Crawler and Indexer. Primary focus on charting growth but
did have a basic search interface. Caused some probelms be-
cause its roboting (initially) used a lot of bandwidth.
1993 ALIWEB Martijn Koster Created in response to the WWW Wanderer and provided
Archie-like indexing for the web. Unlike the Wanderer, ALI-
WEB did not crawl but depended on user submission of sites.
1993 JumpStation
/ WWWW
/ RBSE
- All of these systems were active by December 1993 but only
provided crawling and indexing with little attempt to sort the
results for searchers. [2]
April 1994 WebCrawler Brian Pinker-
ton (University
of Washington
/ NextStep)
First system to index the full text of a web page. Used num-
ber of a links a web page had to determine its importance.
Acquired in June 1995 by AOL for $1M. [1] 41-42.
May 1994 Lycos Michael
Maudlin (CMU
/ DARPA)
Main advance was to add more sophisticated text analysis
(including use of inbound link text) to the basic crawler in
order to improve search results. Maudlin and Davis (CEO)
bought out 80% for $2M in June 1995. Backed by CMGI’s
@Ventures Lycos became a portal and was bought in May
2000 by Terra (Spanish Telecoms giant) for $12.5 billion. It
was later sold to a south Korean company for $100M.
April 1994 Yahoo! Yang and Filo
(Stanford)
Yahoo! was not a search system but a directory. Starting
out as a collection of the founders’ favourite pages as the web
grew it reorganized and provided search facilities but remained
a hierarchical catalogue to which entries were hand-added. In
late 1995 Yahoo! added ‘proper’ search to its directory via
a partnership with Open Text. Later it would partner with
other providers including Altavista and Google until acquiring
its own search technology via purchase of Overture in 2003.
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Aut. 1995
(1993)
Excite /
Architext
6 Alumni of
Stanford
Excite developed out of Architext which was created by 6
Stanford students in 1993. On its launch in 1995, it provided a
web directory and full-text search engine using statistical anal-
ysis of word relationships. It quickly became a fully-fledged
portal and acquired other search engine providers: Magellan
(for around $18M) and WebCrawler from AOL ($4.3M). Ex-
cite itself was acquired by @Home (a broadband company) in
January 1999 for $6.5 billion (renamed to Excite@Home). It
eventually ended up in Chapter 11 proceedings and was sold
to Interactive Search Holdings (ISH) a small holding firm in
2002 for $10 million. In March 2004 ISH was in turn acquired
by Ask Jeeves.
December
15 1995
(1994)
Altavista DEC (Louis
Monier)
The first system to offer ‘full’ search and reasonable quality.
Not only did it have the largest index of material (16M doc-
uments) on its release but it provided (virtually) unlimited
bandwidth and natural language querying. Altavista was im-
mediately successful racking up 300,000 visits on its first day
and serving 4 billion queries in its first year. For a variety
of reasons, including poor management, Altavista despite its
strong start declined rapidly in the late 1990s and was even-
tually acquired by Overture for $80M stock and $60M cash
on February 18, 2003 (Overture were in turn acquired by Ya-
hoo! later that year). Nevertheless Altavista was one of the
first major milestones in search development, providing, in
the words of Gary Flake, “a significant improvement over the
state of the art.” (quoted [1] p. 39).
May 20
1996
Hotbot /
Inktomi
Berkeley Pioneered the paid inclusion model in which sites would pay
for inclusion in search results but this was never as effective
as the pay per click model developed by Overture. Owned
by Wired Digital, it was sold to Altavista and eventually in
December 2003 to Yahoo! for approximately $235 million. [2]
April 1997 Ask Jeeves
(now
Ask.com)
Ask Jeeves Launched as a natural language search engine, Ask originally
used human editors to match queries. For a while they were
powered by DirectHit but in 2001 Ask Jeeves acquired Teoma
to replace DirectHit. On March 21 2005, Ask Jeeves was ac-
quired by Barry Diller’s IAC for $1.85 billion with Ask Jeeves
renamed to Ask in 2006.
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1998 (1996) Google
(BackRub)
Page and Brin
(Google)
Primary innovation was the development of the PageRank ap-
proach to site (and page) ranking as a major input into the
ranking of search results. This method used not only the links
to a site but the reputation (ranking) of those linking sites in
determining the reputation of that site in a recursive process
based on estimating an eigenvector of the adjacency matrix of
the Web (an approach derived directly from the bibliometrics
literature based on the analogy of links between websites and
citations between papers). Google Inc was officially formed on
September 7 1998 but the service had been up and publicly
available for a substantial time previous to that (and had orig-
inally grown out of Page and Brin’s work on a research project
named ‘BackRub’). [1] 73ff. By late 1998 when the company
was formed, google.com was receiving around 10,000 queries
a day (which though substantial was orders of magnitude less
than most of the major existing search engines). [1]. p85.
Table 1: Development of the Major Search Engine Systems 1993-2000. Sources:
[1] Battelle (2005)[40 ff.] and [2] http://www.searchenginehistory.com/#early-
engines
2.3. Making Money, Or, How to Sell Attention via Advertising or Paid
Inclusion. It is clear that the developers of the early search engines had little idea
how they would ever make money from what they were doing (in fact many of
the early innovations were developed in academia or in company labs where this
question had secondary importance). By the mid-to-late nineties most observers,
and most companies themselves, had moved towards the search-engine-as-portal
model where the search-engine was seen as a simple way to generate traffic (and
therefore ‘eyeballs’) which could then be converted into advertising revenue in the
same way as any other attention.
There were two main respects in which this analysis proved to be wrong in the
long run. First, and less importantly, viewing search engines as similar to any
other ‘portal’ (or part of a portal) significantly underestimated the centrality and
importance of search engines in the future Internet environment. Search engines
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are different from other sites because of their crucial ‘gateway’ role – a role whose
importance has grown and grown as the exponential increase in information online
has continued. This role guaranteed not only that traffic to search engines would
continue to increase in line with (or even above) the general rate of usage of the
web as a whole, but also that they would become an essential first-point-of-call for
anyone venturing onto the Internet.13
Second, and more importantly, was the realization that taking search engine users
as equivalent to the users of any other website underestimated significantly their
value from an advertising perspective. Specifically, the user of search engine has
provided an additional, and crucial, piece of information about themselves (or rather
their intentions): their search query.14 This query immediately gives the operator
of a search engine information as to what that user is looking for – for example if
the user has queried for “shoes” we can be fairly certain the user is interested in
shoes (and may even be interested in buying some). As a result, a search-engine
can dramatically increase the relevance of the advertisements it displays – in a very
similar way to the manner in which it uses the user’s query to select the ‘normal’
search results – and increased relevance of course means increased value to those
who wish to advertise.
This idea in itself is fairly old. For example, its underlies all ‘Yellow Pages’, and
almost all advertising will take some account of audience segmentation (after all
advertisements in ‘Autocar’ are likely to reach a different set of people from those
in ‘Vogue’).15 Nevertheless, the realization of the particular value offered by search
13Thus, for example, in 2008 a search engine (Google) would be nominated the top brand in the
UK – and this despite being the only company in the top 50 to have been founded since 1990. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7260107.stm.
14The same is also true, though to a somewhat weaker extent, of a visitor to any website. After all,
if the subject of the website is, say, football then the probability that a given visitor is interested in
football-related information (including advertisements) is significantly higher than for a user drawn
at random from the population. It is this feature that lies behind the massive rise in the online
ad-broking business, that is where advertisements (especially text-advertisements) are provided to
website operators by the very same companies that operate web search (Google, Yahoo! etc). We
shall return to this issue in further detail below.
15And, of course, the use of general demographic information to target product information has not
only continued in the digital, online world but grown dramatically – largely thanks to the increased
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queries, and its general introduction to the online environment, is generally credited
to Bill Gross and the company he started to exploit it: GoTo.com.16 Furthermore,
while the idea may appear obvious in retrospect it was still slow to catch on in
the late 1990s. For example, as Google’s founder’s started to worry about income
generation in late 1999 and early 2000 their main thoughts were about ‘banner
ads’ and the like – part of the old approach of simple ‘cost-per-impression’ (CPM)
advertising in which the ad was (relatively) ‘untargeted’. However such thinking
changed rapidly in the early 2000s, perhaps in part thanks to the sharpened focus
on generating revenue imparted by the dot-com crash of 2001. In particular, in
February 2002 Google launched an Adwords service that allowed firms to bid for
higher ranking in the advertising listings found on their search results pages.17 These
‘keyword auctions’, in which advertisers bid for positioning on individual sets of
keywords, are now used by almost all major search engines and form an area of
active research both within these firms and the wider academic community.18
3. Concentration in the Search Engine Market: The Data
As already mentioned, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the search market
is the very high levels of concentration already evident. Table 3 gives data from
ability to record and process information about users. It is this pool of highly specific information
about users (including complete information about their friendship/acquaintance network) that
makes social sites such as Facebook so attractive to advertisers and so (potentially) valuable to
their operators.
16GoTo.com in turn became Overture in ..., which after acquiring Altavista early 2003, was itself
finally bought by Yahoo! later that year.
17Overture alleged that this service infringed on one of their patents (US patent 6269361)
and began infringement proceedings against Google in April 2002 (http://www.news.com/
2100-1023-876861.html). This dispute was finally settled in 2004 (after Overture’s acquisi-
tion by Yahoo!) with Google issuing 2.7 million shares of common stock to Yahoo! (http:
//www.news.com/Google,-Yahoo!-bury-the-legal-hatchet/2100-1024_3-5302421.html).
18Google, along with many other participants, use a form of generalized second-value auction.
Apparently this was initially adopted simply for performance and usuability reasons (a first-value
auction would result in users continually ‘logging-in’ to check their position and shave their bid).
However, research since then, see e.g. Varian (2007); Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007), has
demonstrated several attractive properties from a purely auction-theoretical perspective. Given
the combination of active use (literally ‘billions of dollars’ worth of keywords auctioned) and the
theoretical challenges in analysing what are, in effect, large dynamic auctions of multiple goods
(consisting of both substitutes and complements) it is likely that this area will remain a fertile area
of investigation for auction economists and others in the years to come.
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Company United Kingdom United States Australia Hong Kong
Google 81.1 59.1 84.0 36.2
Yahoo! 3.9 19.3 3.2 33.1
Microsoft 4.1 7.7 5.8 3.2
Ask.com 2.7 2.8 0.0 0.0
Sogou 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6
Baidu 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7
Table 2. Percentage Market Shares of the Largest Search Engine
Operators (in week ending the 29th of September 2007). Note that
these figures amalgamate for a given operator both traffic to their local
site and their generic one (e.g. both google.co.uk and google.com)
and traffic across different site types (e.g. images and video as well as
normal text search). Source: Hitwise.
Autumn 2007 on the share of major search engines in several different countries.
As can be seen, the C4 values (the combined market share of the top 4 firms) are
over 90% in all jurisdictions except Hong Kong.19 Even more significantly, in all
cases except Hong Kong, the market share of the largest operator is substantially
larger than its nearest competitor, and in the UK and Australia this dominance has
reached the point where the largest operator (Google) has over 80% of the market
– a level an order of magnitude higher than its nearer competitor.20
Should these high market shares be cause for concern? After all, most competi-
tion/antitrust authorities, including for example the EU’s, normally take a market
share over 50% to be indicative of a dominant position. There are two distinct issues
in assessing whether there is cause for concern: first, the search market might still
be competitive even in situations where one company (or a few companies together)
has/have a very large market share. Second, even if the market is not competitive
(in the extreme case a monopoly), given the structure of the search market and,
in particular, the zero charges to search users, this might not be detrimental to
19It may be useful here to compare recent data from China which put Baidu at over 60%, with
Google in second place at around 26% and Yahoo! third at around 10% implying a C4 ≥ C3 = 96%
(see http://blog.searchenginewatch.com/blog/080229-230636).
20Perhaps even more significantly, Google’s market share among younger users (University and High
School) is even greater: over 90% according to Hitslink (http://marketshare.hitslink.com/
articles.aspx, retrieved 2008-03-10). Compared to the 60% figure estimated for the overall US
market this indicates a much, much higher level of concentration among the future user population
than among the present one.
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Figure 1. The structure of the search engine business.
overall social welfare – in fact the existence of a monopoly might even be welfare
improving.21 Clearly, neither of these questions can be adequately addressed without
developing a more detailed analysis. And so it is to this task that we now turn.
4. Modelling the Search Engine Market
4.1. Introduction. The search engine market has certain distinctive features re-
lated to structure, costs and pricing, which must be central to any modelling exercise.
We discuss each of these in turn.
The structure of the search engine market is displayed schematically in Fig-
ure 1. As can be seen it has a basic ‘3-sided’ aspect in which the search engine
acts as a ‘platform’ intermediating between ‘content providers’ (who want ‘users’),
21We shall discuss this point in more detail below so here we confine ourselves to pointing out that
the search market is R&D intensive and so classic Schumpeterian arguments could be made that
increased concentration will have a positive effect on R&D and hence on overall social welfare.
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‘users/searchers’ (who want ‘content’), and ‘advertisers’ (who want access to ‘users’).
Closely related to this structure of connections between agents is the associated pric-
ing (and supply) structure – also illustrated in the Figure.
The first significant fact about pricing is that the primary ‘content’ input for
search engines – the underlying information on the web – is provided for ‘free’.
That is, because of the history and tradition of the Web (and the Internet), search
engines have generally been permitted access to this content at no charge – after all
most information posted publicly on the web is already free for anyone to look at,
and in addition, search engines can help increase traffic to a website.22
The next major fact, and equally important, is that search engines do not directly
charge users for their service but supply it for ‘free’.23 In our model below we shall
take this as an assumption and we therefore think it worthwhile to discuss the likely
reasons for this here, especially as unlike ‘content’, this outcome must be the result
of conscious choice by search engines.
First, the use-value of a search engine (the value of a query) is likely to be very
heterogeneous (both across users and time) and hence may be difficult to price ‘well’.
Second, and more importantly search engines are essentially (meta-)information
providers supplying users with information about where other information is located.
Hence, charging for their service (i.e. charging users for queries) would suffer from
all the classic Arrovian difficulties, most prominently that the value of a given query
is often highly uncertain before it is performed.24 Third, and related to the previous
22Though like all other generalisations this is not completely true. First some websites have
wished to restrict access to search engines, either because of concerns about caching and reuse
or out of a desire to be remunerated by search engines (see e.g. Copiepress v. Google http:
//www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=20070726152837334).
It is also the case that search engines can impose very significant load burdens on websites when
they ‘crawl’ them. This was particularly so in the early days of the web but even today search
engines crawlers can easily account for a very substantial portion of total traffic – one of the authors
has personal experience of this and has actually restricted search engine access to parts of a site
he helps maintain precisely because the performance hit caused by search engine ‘crawls’.
23Some search engines do in fact sell their search facility for use on corporate intranets etc but this
provides a small percentage of their revenue.
24There is also the additional problem here that the value of a given query may well depend on the
ability to perform other ones in complicated ways. Formally, some queries will be complements
and other substitutes and this may vary across users in ways which are difficult to predict.
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two points, is that charging users would necessitate significant transaction costs
on two main counts. First, in relation to administration of charges (processing
and payment). Second in maintaining an effective exclusion regime which prevented
those who had not paid for use for gaining access, directly or indirectly, to the search
engine’s search results. Fourthly, and finally, search engines have an alternative
method to direct charging for generating revenue from users: selling users’ ‘attention’
(and intentions), generated via the use of the search facility, to advertisers.
It is worth emphasizing that this last point is central to the explanation of zero
user-charges for without this (extremely effective) alternative method for raising
revenue there would have been no option but to charge users directly – whatever
the drawbacks of this approach. It also rounds out the details of the charging
structure by making clear that advertisers are the one group out of the three whose
interaction with the search engine has a financial component.
In discussing why search engines do not charge users we have not explicitly ex-
cluded the possibility that the search engines could pay for users to use their search
engine either directly or indirectly. For example, a search engine could pay to ensure
they were the default search option in a web browser,25 or a search engine could even
pay users directly for the searches they perform.26 However, the scope for paying just
as for charging seems fairly limited, at least at the present. The reasons are similar
to the question of charging – transaction costs related to monitoring and payment,
uncertainty as to the (advertising) value of a user etc. Thus, rather than saying that
search engines cannot charge it is perhaps more accurate to say that search engines
25This approach has, in fact, already been adopted with Google sharing ad-revenue with the Mozilla
Foundation in exchange for Google being the default search engine in the Firefox browser (it is
also reported that Yahoo! have entered into a similar deal with a competing Gecko-based browser
named Flock).
26Users might start auctioning their ‘attention’ to the highest bidder in the same way that search
engines auction it to advertisers. Perhaps, more plausibly given how diffuse users are, one might
imagine that intermediaries would enter (perhaps ISPs could take this role) who would locate
themselves between users and the search engine and would charge search engines a fee for directing
their user base to one search engine or another.
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cannot set prices (whether positive or negative) but rather are constrained to price
at zero.
The last significant feature of the search engine market to mention relates to tech-
nology and costs. In particular, search engines are R&D intensive and the market
generally displays high levels of innovation and obsolescence.27 In addition, running
a search engine service, quite apart from any R&D, is highly capital intensive. That
is providing the hardware, support, monitoring etc to keep a search engine running,
responsive and up-to-date requires a very significant investment, quite apart from
any spending on R&D in order to improve the service. Both of these types of cost,
whether related to R&D or the development and maintenance of service infrastruc-
ture, are largely fixed. At the same time the marginal cost of serving one additional
user (or advertiser) is very low (almost zero in fact), especially when compared to
these fixed costs. Taken together, this means that search engine cost structures dis-
play many of the characteristics of traditional (natural monopoly) utilities (on both
the user and advertiser side of the market): very high fixed costs (both in terms of in-
vestment and direct supply) combined with very low (approximately zero) marginal
costs.
4.1.1. Relevant Literature. One might think that, given the three-sided nature of
search, the obvious analytical tools to use would be those developed in the litera-
ture on two-sided, platform, markets (see e.g. Rochet and Tirole (2005); Armstrong
(2005)). However, at least under the present charging structure, the search engine
business does not fit comfortably within this paradigm. In particular, the two pri-
mary groups a search engine sits between are ‘users’ and ‘content providers’ neither
of whom pay to participate, while it is a third group ‘advertisers’ who pay to par-
ticipate.28 This means that the central concern of a two-sided model, namely the
27For example, Microsoft claimed to be spending over $1bn a year on its online services
(including its search engine) in 2006 (http://www.cbronline.com/article_news.asp?guid=
3D810B1B-BBE0-482D-A81C-DBE60BAB97C4).
28Note here that ‘advertisers’ advertise on the search engine not on any content provider. Most
search engine companies are also active in the ‘ad-brokerage’ market for reasons of economies of
scope – selling advertising ‘space’ on search results also provides you with the tools (and customer
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pricing structure, is rather secondary since a price is only set for one of the three
groups, and that, furthermore, with least relevance to the two-sided framework.
Instead it will be more useful to utilize the standard toolkit on oligopolistic compe-
tition, particularly models of Bertrand competition and vertical product differentia-
tion. As we shall see this immediately provides some simple predictions (convergence
to monopoly) which seem borne out by current data – though we will also discuss
why the model is unlikely to fit exactly. Having established this, in following sections
we discuss the implications of monopoly for social welfare and regulation.
4.2. A Formal Model. There are four types of agents in our model: ‘users’ (U),
‘advertisers’ (A), ‘content providers’ (C), and search engines (S). We start with some
basic assumptions which help simplify the analysis and allow us to concentrate on
the key areas of concern:
(1) The pool of material made available by ‘content providers’ is available to all
search engines and is available for free. As such, ‘content providers’ can be
ignored as (strategic) agents in this model leaving us to focus solely on the
other three types.
(2) Search engine quality is reflected in a single variable: v which all users value
positively. That is, all attributes of a search engine such as the amount of
material it indexes (positive), the up-to-dateness of the index (positive), the
relevance of search results (positive), the number of advertisements (zero
or negative), can be incorporated into a single overarching variable named
‘quality’.
(3) Each ‘user’ uses a single search engine and it is the one that offers the highest
utility. Note that it is straightforward, and perhaps even more logical, to
interpret ‘users’ in this context as ‘usage’, that is as denoting individual
base) to sell advertising ‘space’ on general sites. Furthermore, ‘ad-brokerage’ does fit well within
the two-sided model since here the two sides (‘content providers’ and ‘advertisers’) do care about
the size of the other group and the ‘ad-broker’ naturally takes a platform role. However, here we
are going to focus exclusively on search engine provision and will ignore related (and significant)
business activities, such as those related to large-scale ‘Ad-Brokerage’.
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queries not individuals themselves. Not only does this obviate debate about
the correctness of assuming that individuals use a single search engine,29 but
it also fits both with the data – most market share information is measured in
terms of usage (‘hits’/queries on the website), not as the share of individual
users. Thus in what follows whenever one reads ‘user’ one can, if one wishes,
substitute, ‘usage’ or ‘query’.
Formally, there are N search engines: S1, · · · , SN . Search engine i has quality vi
and charges price piu to users. There are a continuum of potential users represented
by the interval [a, b] and indexed by t (without loss of generality we may take a =
0, b =∞ and thereby map potential users one to one the positive real line). A user’s
utility from using search engine i is given by:30
U it = Ut(v
i, piu) = u(t, v
i, piu)
It is assumed that utility is increasing in quality for all users – u(t, vi, piu) is
increasing in v for all t. Note also that the form chosen implicitly assumes that
there is no variation in the valuation of quality across search engines – that is users
just care about the level of quality not which search engine it is associated with
(note, however, that quality may of course be valued differently by different users).
Let qiu be the total user demand for search engine i. The user’s outside option
will be normalized to 0 and users use the search engine which delivers the highest
utility. Thus, qiu equals the set of t such that U
i
t ≥ 0 and U it > U jt for all other
search engines j. Thus formally qiu is a set, however when no ambiguity arises, we
may equate it with the measure of this set, i.e. the total number users using search
engine i. Finally, note that search engine user demand, qiu, will be a function of
29There is some degree of evidence that users do use multiple search engines. For example Search
Engine Watch report figures of Harvest Digital () which showed that, of ‘experienced’ internet
users, fully 20% regularly use four or more search engines. However it appears that most users use
only one search engine most of the time.
30A specific form that is similar to that used in the vertical differentiation literature would be
U it = θtv
i − kt − piu where kt is a user specific cost of using the engine, piu is the price charged
by search engine i to users and θt = θ(t) is user-specific value for quality (assumed, wlog, to have
θ′ > 0).
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own quality, vi and of price, piu as well as all the qualities and prices of other search
engines: qiu = q
i
u(v
i, v−i, piu, p
−i
u ).
At this point we make a major assumption which reflects the current pricing
structure of the search engine market and will help greatly simplify our analysis:
Assumption 1. Search engines do not charge users: piu = 0.
Thus, utility becomes U it = u(t, v
i) and user demand for search engine i becomes
qiu(v
i, v−i). It will also be useful, for notational convenience, to drop the search
engine index i except where it is absolutely necessary for clarity. Thus, Ut = u(t, v)
etc.
Having established the basic user model we now turn to advertising. Advertising
will be modelled using a reduced form approach as follows. First let the advertising
revenue generated by user t at search engine i be denoted by a(t, vi, qiu) – a(t, v, qu)
without the i index. Total advertising revenue at search engine i is then given by
the sum of this revenue across all users of that search engine:
RA =
∫
qu
a(t, qu, v)dt = RA(qu, v)
The total costs of a search engine are a function of quality, the number of users and
the amount of advertising: C = C(v, qu, RA) = C(v, qu, RA(v, qu) = C¯(v, qu). It will
be useful to divide C up into two parts as C = c+cA where c = c(v, qu) = C(v, qu, 0)
are ‘core’ or ‘user’ costs and cA(v, qu) = C¯−c are ‘advertising’ costs (i.e. those arising
from managing ‘advertisers’). We now make our second assumption that reflects our
discussion in the introduction:
Assumption 2. ‘Core/user’ costs are primarily fixed. In particular the marginal
cost of an additional user is approximately zero. Furthermore, the cost of supplying
a given quality is (up to a point) independent of the number of users.31
31Recall that quality has several components. Pure search results quality is essentially a nonrival
good and therefore has absolutely zero marginal cost across users (the costs of producing algorithm
to make the index and rank results are one-off). However the costs of maintaining the search
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Putting together the cost function and the revenue function we have that profits
are given by:
Π = RA − (c+ cA)
Before proceeding to the results of the next section it is worth making some ob-
servations. First, interpret qu as a scalar which (taking other search engine qualities
as constant) is a function of v.32 We can then invert and take v as a function of
demand v = v(qu). Then defining p¯(qu) = RA(qu)/qu we have:
Π = p¯(qu)qu − C(qu)
Note that this now looks like a classic vertical product differentiation problem in
which p¯ now represents the price charged to a user (here it is the derived price of a
user in terms of advertising revenue). However there are some major differences, in
particular p¯(qu)qu is guaranteed to be always increasing in qu and it does not make
sense to consider qu as a function of p¯. Furthermore, users do not choose on the basis
of price but on the basis of quality so there is no complementarity between quality
and price (this would only occur here if one allowed the amount of advertising to
negatively impinge on demand – in that case qu would implicitly come to depend on
p¯). Specifically, as we assume that users are homogeneous in their taste for quality,
our first assumption has converted the general vertical differentiation model into
something very similar to a classic Bertand setup with firms competing on quality
instead of price (and higher quality being preferred by consumers rather than lower
price).
service and keeping it responsive to users may have a greater marginal component – while costs of
IT equipment and maintenance still have significant fixed costs there is a point at which increasing
demand necessitates installing new servers, buying more bandwidth etc.
32Strictly speaking qu is a set not a scalar. However, it could also be interpreted as the measure of
this set (and hence a scalar) as long as we are careful – in particular by requiring that the increase
in size arose from taking strict supersets (one may have the case of two sets of ‘users’ A, B with
|A| > |B| but because of its composition of B being more valuable).
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5. Market Structure
In this section we formalize some the intuitive arguments above regarding search
market structure. Our basic result is that monopoly, or near-monopoly, is the likely
outcome given cost and pricing structure of search. We supplement this formal with
an extensive discussion.
Proposition 3. User’s will only use the search engine(s) with the maximum quality.
Proof. User t derives utility from search engine i:
U it = u(t, v
i)
Thus, their utility from search engine i is greater than from j if, and only if,
search engine i has higher quality and this holds independent of t: U it > U
j
t ⇔ vi >
vj,∀t. Hence, any users (who is maximizing utility) will use only search engines
with maximum quality, i.e. whose v satisfies v ≥ vj,∀j. 
In the case where several search engines offer this maximum quality we need to
specify how market demand is divided. The simplest approach is to assume that
all demand configuration are equally like which implies that each of these search
engines has equal (expected) revenue. To avoid trivial cases we shall also make the
following assumption:
Assumption 4 (Basic profitability conditions). a) firms with zero quality are in-
active and earn zero profits (b) if there is only firm active, at least for one quality
level v > 0 that firm can earn non-zero profits (i.e. it is profitable to supply search
in the absence of competition from other firms).
Proposition 5. Assuming continuity of costs in quality there is no (Nash) equilib-
rium in pure strategies of this simultaneous quality choice game.
Proof. Let v be the maximum quality offered by a search engine. Must have v > 0
(if not some firm can profitably deviate). Since provision of quality is costly for
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a search engine no search engine will offer quality in (0, v) since they could either
deviate to 0 or v and be strictly better off.
Assume that more than one search engine offers this top quality v > 0. Both
must have non-zero market shares (if not then the one with zero market share must
be making a loss since quality incurs a non-zero cost). Assume, first that quality
can be varied continuously in costs, i.e. for any δ > 0 there exists and  such that a
firm can spend less than δ but increase its quality by . By ‘deviating’ in this way
one of the firms can offer quality v +  and thereby obtain complete market share
with cost less than δ. Since for any quality increase above zero (and hence for )
the gain in market share is equal to the combined market share of all other firms it
is bounded below (at a level above zero). As (advertising) revenue is increasing in
market share, then the gain in income from advertising is bounded below by some
amount A > 0. Choosing an  and δ such that δ < A we have that such a deviation
is profitable and hence no equilibrium can exist in which more than one firm offers
a non-zero quality.
Thus one firm offers non-zero quality v and garners all of the market. Let v0
be the maximum quality such that the firm makes zero profits. Suppose this firm
chooses v′ < v0 then another firm could enter with v ∈ (v′, v0) and obtain positive
profits (so not a NE). Thus, firm must offer v0. But, given that other firms are
offering v = 0 this firm could deviate to another v and obtain positive profits and
so this cannot be a NE either. QED. 
Remark 6. This problem is very similar to the problem of a R&D race with deter-
ministic discovery functions.
This non-existence result is largely the artefact of the strict simultaneity of moves
and the discontinuity of payoffs it creates. It therefore makes sense to vary the setup
by allowing one firm to ‘move first’ (a Stackelberg approach). We then have:
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Proposition 7. When one firm moves first (the leader) there is a single (pure-
strategy) Nash equilibrium in which the leader offers a non-zero quality v and is the
only search engine in use. All other search engines offer a zero quality level and
have no users. The single active firm makes zero profits.
Proof. One proceeds exactly as in the previous proof except that if the leader offers
v0 the threat of subsequent entry means that deviation is not a best-response and
hence this is a Nash equilibrium. 
5.1. Discussion. Clearly, in reality, the situation is rarely this simple and the result
is rarely this stark. On the one hand, even with a very dominant firm, there are
likely to be some other firms active in the market – i.e. a pure monopoly outcome is
unlikely,33 and it would therefore be better to interpret this result not as predicting
absolute monopoly but simply a single highly dominant firm. On the other hand,
though there is monopoly, there is also ‘strong’ contestability in the sense that the
active (monopoly) firm is constrained by the threat of competition to make zero
profits and (associatedly) to supply the maximum feasible quality. Both predictions
are central to the competitiveness of the search market into the future. It is therefore
important to consider how robust they are; in particular to evaluate whether they
flow from a particular aspect of the formalism (e.g. the use of one-shot Stackelberg)
or reflect deeper features of the general environment. We shall discuss each of these
two items in turn.
5.1.1. Dominance. It is first worth recalling the main factors driving our formal
result: (a) a cost structure which involves high fixed costs (for quality) and low
marginal costs (serving additional users)34 (b) pure quality competition for users
33This is relevant to the empirical fact that today, though there may be one firm has very large
proportion of the market, there are still other firms active.
34Recall that this cost structure arises from two distinct aspects of the search engine model:
economies of scale in the supply of the service itself, and the fixed costs of R&D. We have not
distinguished these explicitly in our modelling since both contribute to the overall ‘quality’ of the
experience.
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(i.e. zero prices and no user heterogeneity). In our view, any model which shares
these basic features is likely to feature very high levels and a single dominant firm.
In particular, high fixed cost/low marginal costs alone would imply a concentrated
market. After all, as noted earlier, this cost structure is very similar to that of a
classic ‘natural monopoly’ utility – a comparison that is all the more noteworthy
given the basic, and crucial, infrastructural role that search engines play in the
nascent ‘information society’.35
This existing tendency to concentration is then reinforced by the pricing struc-
ture: with a zero price competition for users (and hence advertisers) takes the form
of a winner-takes-all competition. It is this lack of competition on price that differ-
entiates the current setup from the classic vertical differentiation models (see e.g.
Shaked and Sutton (1983); Sutton (1991)) in which firms choose both quality and
price. However it is noteworthy that those models, even with this price flexibility,
often predict significant concentraction, especially when quality (and the associated
fixed costs) are ‘endogenous’ (as is the case, for example, with R&D and advertising).
Of course it is important to note the implicit assumption here would be that there
is a single (overall) ‘quality’ attribute which all users value positively (and that this
was the only attribute differing across search engines). In reality, it is likely that
there is some degree of heterogeneity across users. Brand preference is one obvious,
though slightly nebulous, form of such heterogeneity. Another possibility would be
that search engines specialize in searching a particular kind of content.36 However,
35Just as access to, say, electricity is now considered essential, at least in most ‘developed’ countries,
so we can imagine that, soon, access to the Internet and, therefore, to a search engine, will be an
equally essential requirement.
36For example, it is argued that part of Sogou and Baidu’s popularity come from their provision
of a specific ‘MP3-search’ facility that allows users to easily search for music files on the Internet
(most of which will be unauthorised copies – which perhaps explains the unwillingness of other
search engines to emulate them).
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any such heterogeneities are likely be fairly limited compared to the general, homoge-
nous, preference for ‘quality’ and, as such, unlikely to change the basic property of
the existence of a single dominant firm.37
5.1.2. Contestability. Thus, it is not surprising that the search engine market is
already concentrated, and growing more so. However, might it still be competitive?
As discussed in our model, the (credible) threat of entry means that although there
is a single firm it behaves rather like it would under competition. Here, even though
the fixed costs are large because the game is static and deterministic the threat
of entry is credible. In reality, the market is dynamic with investments in quality
(particularly those in R&D) are made sequentially. Thus, the question as to whether
the dominant firm is insulated from the threat of competition by significant ‘barriers
to entry’ is largely determined by how these dynamics interact with the large (sunk)
fixed costs.38
Generally, the question will revolve around the degree to which an incumbent can
credibly ‘block’ entrants. This in turn depends on a variety of factors. Two of the
most important on which we focus are (a) the size (and ‘sunkness’) of fixed costs; (b)
the degree of (non-price, non-quality) ‘lock-in’ to an incumbent due, for example,
to switching costs or ‘network effects’.
Let us take each of these issues in turn. First, just as the general capital costs
seem to be large and growing. Most of the major players have R&D spending in
excess of $500 million a year and the core infrastructure appears to be equally large.39
Furthermore, most of these incurred costs will be sunk: hardware and infrastructure
37However, adding such ‘minor’ heterogeneities would allow the model to become more realistic by
predicting the existence of several small, fringe firms.
38For example, pursuing the analogy with the R&D literature, there are a variety of result (e.g.
Harris and Vickers (1985)) which show that in a multi-stage race when the ‘leader’ has a large
enough advantage even though ‘followers’ may exist (or could enter) the ‘leader’ can ignore this
threat and behave like an (uncontested) monopolist – obtaining, for example, non-zero profits.
39This is also borne out by anecdotal evidence. At a 2007 round-table on search in Toulouse
Francois Bourdoncle of Exalead stated that today that the core code for a search engine was
around 3 million lines and would take $20-100 million to develop – and of course this excludes the
cost of actually running the service.
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have limited resale value (obsolescence is high) and the results of R&D will be highly
search-specific. Hence, it would appear both that the costs of entry are large and
growing, and that, facing the threat of entry, an incumbent can credibly commit to
be ‘aggressive’ – for example via heavy R&D spend to improve quality.
Coming to the second point our focus will be on switching costs. If switching
costs are high then even if an actual or potential competitor offers a better quality
product they will find it hard (rapidly) to obtain market share. Note here that
the question of switching costs applies both to users and to advertisers as both are
needed for a search engine to be successful. That said, one would expect that if
users switched it would not be hard to persuade advertisers to switch as well so it
seems reasonable to focus on the user-side switching costs.
At first glance it would appear that switching costs are very low. After all, a
search engine user can switch to an alternative by simply visiting a different website.
However, it is not clear that switching costs are as low as they appear. In particular,
there may be substantial brand effects as well as user adaptation to the behaviour
of a particular search engine.
On the first of these points, a recent paper by Jansen, Zhang, and Ying (2007)
examined the impact of brand on the evaluation of search results and found a signif-
icant impact. Specifically, they displayed an identical set of results through differ-
ent ‘branded’ interfaces and elicited user evaluations of their quality (‘relevance’).
Despite using these identical results they found a 25% difference in rating across
engines. Along similar lines, it is interesting to note that there is significant geo-
graphical variation in search engine shares. Of course, a significant portion of this
may reflect genuine heterogeneity in consumer tastes and in what search engines are
offering. However, it is also likely that at least some of this reflects brand ‘sticki-
ness’. For example Yahoo!’s core search system is likely to be the same in the UK
and the US yet its market share is approximately five times larger in the US than
in the UK (19.3% vs. 3.9%). Similarly, Google who are the leaders in almost every
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other jurisdiction, trail Baidu (the first-mover) in China despite significant efforts
on Google’s part.40 While such jurisdictional heterogeneity, particularly where it
relates to first-mover advantage, does not necessarily imply high switching costs,41
it does, at the very least, imply that there are significant factors affecting market
share’s which do not arise straightforwardly from superior quality of service.
On the second point, it is important to note that an increasing number of users
pursue fairly sophisticated query strategies, often refining (and refining again) their
initial query if it fails to turn up what they are looking for. It seems likely (though
not empirically tested to our knowledge) that refinement strategies are search engine
specific. As such, switching to a different engine is likely to involve some re-learning
costs as a user adapts to the different search strategy required by the different
search engine. It is also noteworthy, that an increasing number of search engines
offer some form of explicit or implicit personalization. Such personalization, which
could be used either to improve a user’s search experience or increase their value
to advertisers, is clearly search engine specific. It therefore also leads to increased
switching-costs. These points are obviously conjectural, however there is some em-
pirical evidence that users display increasing ‘loyalty’ to search engines. For example
a Jupiter Research study from 200642 looked at user behaviour when they did not
find what they were looking for with their first query. They found that 41% tried
again (compared to just 28% 4 years earlier in 2002). Of these 82% refined their
query on their existing search engine and 18% switched engines whereas 4 years
earlier only 68% stayed with their existing engine (and 32% switched).
40It is also worth noting that Google should be considered the original ‘first-mover’ in most of the
jurisdictions in which it has a lead despite not being the first to enter formally (see Table reftable-
search-history for details) because all of the other companies to pre-date it in the search market
either were not focused on search itself (for example Yahoo! was a directory) or fell out of contention
before the importance of search (qua search) was recognized (most prominently Altavista).
41For example it fits comfortably within the escalation models of Sutton, and in fact Sutton (1991,
1998) provides a large variety of cases where ‘random’ advantages early on in an industry have
played out into permanent long-term dominance.
42Reported at http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=3598011.
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5.1.3. Conclusion. To sum up, the monopoly (or near-monopoly) result seems rea-
sonably robust to variations in the model structure given the underlying zero-user
price/quality competition model of search. In addition, this result fits fairly well
as first-order approximation as the current state of the search market in most ju-
risdictions (especially when dynamics are taken into account). However, the strong
contestability (and associated zero-profits) is not likely to be very robust.
Thus, when examining the effect of monopoly it will seem reasonable to focus on
the case where the monopolist has some degree of flexibility in choosing variables
such as the level of quality (by contrast, in the basic model above the monopolist
is constrained to offer the maximum possible level of quality). Furthermore, in a
dynamic model this flexibility would be likely to grow over time, concomitantly
with the growth in the investment needed to rival the incumbent’s quality level (it
is these existing, ‘sunk’, costs which form the barrier to entry/competition in this
market).43 Thus, in the next section, a fair degree of latitude will be assumed for
the monopolist in regard of pricing and quality provision,44 and our attention will
be on how the monopolist’s choice of these variables affect consumer and societal
welfare rather than on issues of market structure and market share.
6. Monopoly and Welfare
6.1. Monopoly. Having established the focus on the monopoly case we can make
some simplifications. First, total demand qu can be interpreted as a simple scalar
43This contrasts with a more two-sided model such as that found in the operating systems market
where the barrier to entry for the monopolist (Microsoft) is related to the existing (and therefore
expected future) installed base on the two sides of the market (application providers and con-
sumers). That said, it is possible that the search market may develop in the direction of a more
platform-like, two-sided model if content owners become more active (and therefore restrictive)
with regard to search engine crawls and usage of material, particularly as search engine seek to
expand the pool of material they cover (consider, for example, efforts such as Google Books). In
this case, the analogies with the activities of participants in other two-sided markets may become
more noticeable. For example, just as Microsoft have made significant investments downstream
to integrate into the ‘applications/software’ side of the market for the twin purposes of promoting
consumer demand and controlling porting (see Pollock (2007)) so we are likely to see increased ac-
tivity by search engine firms to move into content ownership for analogous reasons (this is already
partially occurring with Google’s acquisition of YouTube, Yahoo!’s acquisition of Flickr etc).
44If one needed to incorporate the impact of external competition, either actual or potential, this
could be imposed in the form of a minimum quality level or the like.
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equal to the measure of users whose utility is positive (u(t, v) ≥ 0). It may be
sometimes useful to invert the relationship qu(v) to obtain v as a function of qu.
45
Using this we then have:
Π = RA(v, q)− c(v, q)− cA(v, q)
= RA(v, q(v))− c(v, q(v))− cA(v, q(v))
= RA(v)− c(v)− cA(v)
The monopolist’s profit maximization problem is then to choose the quality level
vM that maximizes this function. We have that vM satisfies the following first order
condition:
R′ = Rv +Rqq′ = c′ + c′A (6.1)
Where subscripts indicate partial derivatives (the A subscript on R has been
dropped), ′ indicates a total derivative, and c′A is shorthand for c
′
A(q(v)) = C¯
′ − c′
(which is necessarily positive).
6.2. Welfare. The first step in analyzing welfare is to define a social welfare function
W . We proceed as follows:
W = Utility of Users + Profits of Search Engine + Profits of Advertisers
= UU + ΠS + ΠA
Note that, following on from the previous section, we assume there is only one
search engine. We have also implicitly assumed that consumer surplus and producer
surplus are accorded equal value in the social welfare function. Such an assumption
is reasonably standard but one could argue that the widespread and diverse set of
users and the relatively concentrated ownership of most search engine companies
might merit explicit distributional weights. We have not pursued this possibility
45We will assume this relationship to be invertible so that we can write v(qu) though strictly all
we have is qu is non-decreasing in quality.
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but note that it would be relatively easy to introduce an explicit weighting into the
analysis.
Our next step is to observe that users’ utility, search engine profits and users’
utility must all be inter-related. After all, when advertisers pay money to the search
engine they must expect to recoup these funds in the form of more buyers or higher
prices. Here we would like to avoid specifying in detail the form of the advertising
market and the equilibrium conditions and thus we take a reduced form approach
to connect advertising, search and users. First, recall that RA is the total revenue
from advertisers accruing to the search engine (which is therefore also equivalent
to total payments by advertisers), and RU the total additional revenue accruing to
advertisers from users as a result of their advertising (that is revenue related to
their advertising activities). Next let UA be the (gain in) utility users derive as
a result of advertising. Then total advertising profits (in respect of the activities
under consideration here) are ΠA = RU − RA. Search profits are RA − (c + ca).
Meanwhile total user utility is given by the combination of the utility from search46
US(v, qu) =
∫
qu
Ut with the (net) utility from advertising UA − RU . With these
formulations social welfare now has the form:
W = US + (UA −RU) + (RA − c− cA) + (RU −RA) = US + UA − c− cA
The final step is to specify UA, the impact of advertising on users’ utility. Here
there are three options which could be put under the classic headings of advertising
as:
‘Good’: UA > 0. In this case advertising directly improves users’ welfare,
perhaps by enabling better matches between consumers and producers, re-
ducing ‘search’ time,47 or simply directly increasing the valuation of the good
advertised.
46As before all superscript i indices used to index the search engine will be omitted as there exists
only one search engine.
47See for example, the arguments in Athey and Ellison (2007).
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‘Bad’: UA < 0. Advertising decreases consumer’s utility, for example by reduc-
ing the quality of matches, or creating incentives for malicious behaviour.48
‘Neutral’: UA = 0. Advertising has a neutral effect on consumer’s utility
generating neither direct benefits nor direct costs. This would correspond to
the classic case of advertising as a war of attrition in which all (advertising)
rents are dissipated in competition (or, in this case, payments to the search
engine).
With plausible arguments on both the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sides our approach will be
to compromise and adopt the neutral perspective in which UA = 0. While this is a
convenient simplification we would point out that, obviously, a different assumption
whether in the positive or negative direction could have a substantial impact on the
overall welfare findings and this should be kept in mind by the reader. With this
assumption, social welfare takes the final form:
W = US(v, qu(v))− c− cA
48See Edelman (2006, 2007). As Edelman summarises: “Across all search terms we analyze, a
Google ad is on average more than twice as likely to take a user to an unsafe site [one which
installed spyware, adware and the like without fully informing the user] than is a Google organic
link. At Ask, the difference is especially pronounced: Their sponsored results are almost four times
as risky as their organic listings.” Summed over all engines his data indicated that ‘organic’ results
had 2.0% ‘red-rated’ sites and 1.1% ‘yellow-rated’ sites while for ‘sponsored’ results the rates were
6.5% and 2.0% respectively. Edelman goes on to give numerous examples of ways in which the
sponsored results (adverts) on search engines may be substantially poorer than the organic results.
To take one example: in May 2006 the top sponsored link for ‘Skype’ was download-it-free.com
who, despite their name, charged $29 to download a copy Skype, a program that is supplied for
free by its producer (skype.com – the first ‘organic link for this search). He also discusses (see e.g.
http://www.benedelman.org/news/012606-1.html) the possible incentives for search engines to
behave in this way due to the large revenues that ‘bad’ sponsored links can generate.
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Since advertising does not now enter the formulation for W except via cA it is
immediate that we want cA = 0⇔ RA = 0.49 Thus we reduce to:
W (C) = US(v, q(v))− c(v)
Maximizing with respect to v we have the socially optimal level of quality vW
solves:
U ′(vW ) = Uv + Uqq′ = c′
6.3. How Optimal is Monopoly? The next step is to compare this search quality
v, and usage qu, with that under monopoly as defined in equation (6.1):
R′(vM) = Rv +Rqq′ = c′ + c′A
In particular we would like to know whether the quality level under monopoly is
too high or too low compared to the socially optimal level (equivalently is search
quality ‘over-provided’ or ‘under-provided’ under monopoly).
One might thing this question is rather trivial. Consider the more traditional case
where R denotes revenue arising from a traditional charging regime. In that case it
would normal to assume certain specific relationships between utility U and revenue
R. In particular when increasing quality v:
• The utility from an extra user t (Uqq′) would be larger than or equal to the
revenue received by the monopolist (Rqq
′).
• The effect on existing users would be greater for utility (Uv) than for revenue
(Rv).
49This implicitly assumes the search engine could be directly funded by non-distortionary taxation.
Clearly this is unlikely to be the case and therefore even a publicly provided search engine might
want to use advertising if that were an efficient way to raise revenue (it might also be politically more
palatable than raising taxes elsewhere). Nevertheless, the more general point that ‘society’ would
choose a lower level of advertising than the search engine is likely to be robust. Furthermore, the
fact that cA is zero will have no material impact on the remainder of the welfare analysis presented
below (i.e. replacing the zero value for cA with the value for the monopolist will have no significant
effects).
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Furthermore, with a ‘normal’ assumption of diminishing returns to quality, these
functions are decreasing in v. Together with the fact that:
R′ = Rv +Rqq′ = c′ + c′A ≥ c′ = Uv + Uqq′ (6.2)
These would imply that vW ≥ vM , that is that the monopolist under-provides
search quality (analogously to, but for slightly different reasons, to the way a mo-
nopolist under-supplies demand).
However, here this need not be the case. In particular the very fact that search
engines choose not to charge users implies that the value that a search engine extracts
from an additional user in terms of advertising revenues is higher than the price it
could charge that same user, and higher even perhaps than the value of that query
to the user.50 In such a situation Rq will be larger than Uq and hence one could
have, depending on the relative magnitude’s of the direct effect of quality (Rv, Uv),
that vM > vW .
Similar effects would also obtain if, as is possible or even likely, revenue displays
increasing returns in the number of users.51 Increasing returns would occur for two
distinct reasons. First, and most obviously, economies of scale involved in advertising
on a search engine, for example those that would arise from a fixed cost in generating
or placing an advert, would lead to advertising demand increasing in the number of
search engine users and hence to revenue increasing in the number of users. Second,
economies of scope in advertising, arising, for example where an advertiser wishes to
carry out several (related) campaigns each targeting different types of users and/or
queries, would also lead to advertising demand increasing the number of users and,
50Of course this is modulo transaction cost issues and the question as to whether a search engine
could price discriminate among users as effectively as it can among advertisers. If not, then of
course the search engine has the classic problem of all monopolists that it has to charge the same
price to all which, depending on the distribution of user values, may not be very attractive. Search
engines also has the problem that it is selling information (the query result) whose value is highly
uncertain in advance. As a result users may be unwilling to pay in advance and it is difficult to
extract payment ex-post. Nevertheless, and in spite of these caveats, the basic point that the value
a search engine extracts from advertisers per user may be more than that user’s query value still
stands.
51And even if charges are, say, per click-through or per-view.
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hence, to revenue increasing in the number of users. In both these cases we obtain
that Rqq
′ is, at least over some portion of its domain, increasing in quality rather
than decreasing. This in turn means that, not only might revenue be increasing in
v, but that (total) marginal revenue R′ may be larger than total marginal utility,
U ′, and hence that the monopolist’s quality vM may be greater than the socially
optimal level vW .
Illustrations of these two basic cases are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The two
models are exactly the same except for the advertising revenue function. In the first
case this is simply a linear function of users while in the second the revenue function
is increasing (R ∼ q2) and then decreasing (R ∼ q1/2) in the number of users. In the
first figure, as would be expected from the previous discussion, the monopoly quality
is lower than the welfare maximizing quality. In the second figure, by contrast, the
monopoly quality is higher than the welfare maximizing quality, illustrating the
point that if advertising revenue displays increasing returns to users the monopolist
may oversupply quality.52
Having just explored how the way advertising revenue depends on users we should
now turn to the other main functional associations: the relationship of total utility
to quality and users (U ′ = Uv + Uqq′), and revenue’s dependence on quality Rv.
Improving search quality increases both the utility of existing users (Uv > 0)
and the demand for search (as new queries become feasible) Uqq > 0
′. In the case
of utility, unlike for revenue, it seems reasonable that the demand effects display
classic diminishing returns, i.e. Uqq
′ is increasing in quality but at a decreasing rate.
However, Uv is also increasing in v and, more importantly, may display increasing
returns (discussed below in more detail). Thus, it is quite possible that U ′ itself
displays increasing returns to quality, at least over some portion of the quality
range.
52Note that in this case, unlike in the first one, whether oversupply occurs will depend on the
parameters. That is, even with increasing returns if the increasing returns in users are weak (or
demand diminishes sharply in quality) then it will still be the case that the monopoly quality is
less than the socially optimal quality.
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Figure 2. Welfare (solid line) and Profits (dashed line) as a func-
tion of quality when revenue and user utility both display decreasing
returns to quality.
Figure 3. Welfare (solid line) and Profits (dashed line) as a func-
tion of quality when utility displays decreasing returns and revenue
(initially) increasing returns to users (and thereby quality).
How might increasing returns come about. To take a very simple example, sup-
pose that quality level v a small increase in quality benefits each existing user by g(v)
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then Uv = g(v)q(v) and Uvv = g
′q + gq′ which may be positive even if g′ is negative
– i.e. there are diminishing returns to each user. To see the situation more generally
it is worth returning to the individual user utility function: u(t, v) (recall with the
definition of q(v) as the solution of u(q, v) = 0 we have : U(v, q) =
∫ q
0
u(t, v)dt).
Consider the following two examples, in which search quality effects utility by re-
ducing the cost of search (but leaves the value of a given search constant):
• u(t, v) = k − t√
v+1
. Intuition: each user (query) has a constant value k
but a variable cost of performance (to the user) which is increasing in t
and diminishing in quality v. Demand also displays diminishing returns:
q(v) = k
√
1 + v. For a given user there are diminishing returns to quality
and these are sufficiently strong that total utility still displays diminishing
returns: U(v, q) = kq − q2
2
√
1+v
= k
2
√
1 + v.
• u(t, v) = 3t2(k− t√
v+1
). Intuition: each user (query) has an increasing value
but also increasing costs. Costs are reduced by search quality. One could
think of this situation as a case where queries are of increasing complexity
with both the value and costs increasing (quadratically here) in that com-
plexity. Demand, q(v) is the same as before but now U(v, q) = kq3− 3q4
4
√
1+v
=
k4
4
(1 + v)1.5, which displays increasing returns to quality.
As these examples show, there can be a fairly subtle interplay between demand
and the value of quality, and the overall effect can be to make total user utility
display either increasing or decreasing returns to quality. It should also be clear
that there is no necessary reason for utility and revenue to be closely connected
in any way. In particular, investments in quality which improve the net value of
existing queries, for example by reducing their cost as in these examples, would be
unlikely to have any effect on demand for advertising (if anything, and as we are
about to discuss, they are likely to reduce ad-revenue). This effect, arising from the
fact that Uv > 0, increases the socially optimal level and therefore makes it more
likely that the private, monopoly, provided level of search quality is too low.
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Finally, we come to the question of quality’s direct effect on the monopolist’s
revenue from advertising: Rv. As already discussed, it seems obvious that the
indirect effect of quality on revenue, via an increase in the user base, is positive.
However the direct effect, we would argue, is likely to be negative or, at best, zero.
This is for two reasons which we term the ‘substitution’ and the ‘antagonism’ effects.
The substitution effect arises from the fact that ‘ads’ can be seen as a method of
helping consumers search. For example if you search for ‘shoes’ or, even more
explicitly, ‘buy shoes’, it may actually be useful for advertisements related to shoes,
and purchasing shoes, to be displayed. In this case,53 if a search engine is able to
display ‘ads’ relevant to users’ search intentions, it is highly likely that the search
engine is also able to display organic search results that are relevant. In this case, the
advertisements and the search results are substitutes in the sense that better search
means less need to click on advertisements (and vice versa). As such, improving
search quality, by improving the search results the user receives for a given query,
must necessarily reduce the likelihood of the user clicking on the advertisements
(‘sponsored’ links) presented alongside. Conversely, worse search quality actually
increases the likelihood, for a given search, that a user clicks on an ad rather than
an ‘organic’ result. The effect also operates from the opposite, ‘advertisers’ direction.
If a search engine had such amazing quality that whenever one was looking to ‘buy
shoes’ the ‘good’ places to buy shoes were presented as the top search results there
would be much less reason to advertise.54 However if the search engine does not
present that information then it will necessary for companies to advertise, and, once
again, an increase in search quality reduces advertising revenue (and vice-versa).55
53See e.g. Athey and Ellison (2007) for explicit argument for this approach.
54If the company is good you are already in the list and if it is bad there is no point advertising
as users will know, ipso facto, it is bad.
55There are some suggestions that over time Google have downgraded search results which of are
an explicitly commercial nature. Of course this could simply be to get rid of ‘spam’ or overly
commercial information. However, as just discussed, it also forces those commercial organizations
to buy advertising. Even outside of the commercial sphere it appears this approach is taking hold:
it was recently reported that a UK Government department ended up buying Google keyword
advertisements as they found this was a more effective way of getting information to potential
users than relying on the ‘organic’ search results themselves.
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The second effect, which we label the ‘antagonism’ effect, arises from the fact that
for a given query search results may, by providing information that is ‘antagonis-
tic’ to an advertiser, reduce the advertising revenue for that query. For example,
consider the following hypothetical example in which there is a query for ‘vitamin
supplements’ which generates both ‘organic’ search results as well as advertisements
to firms which supply such supplements. Suppose (this is hypothetical), that there
is new research out that demonstrates that such supplements are of no value (or
even harmful). Displaying such a result high up (perhaps at the top of the search
results) may increase quality for users but may well reduce the likelihood a given
user clicks on advertisement. As such by making this information prominent one
reduces the amount of advertising revenue generated from that query.
Together these two effects imply that the direct impact of quality on a search
engine’s revenue is negative (or at best non-positive): Rv ≤ 0. Of course, it is
important to remember that search quality also has an indirect impact via increasing
the number of users/queries. Furthermore, it is likely that this effect is larger than
the direct one: |Rqq′| > |Rv|. Thus, overall it is still highly probable that revenue
is increasing in search quality, R′ = Rv + Rqq′ > 0, as the effect of better quality
in increasing queries outweighs any effect of quality in reducing revenue per query.
Nevertheless, this is in contrast with the case of social welfare and users’ utility
where quality’s direct impact (Uv) is strongly positive, and this is therefore one
major reason to suppose that a private search engine will under-provide quality.
We can summarize the above discussion in the following ‘proposition’:
Proposition 8. It is more likely that the monopolist’s under-supplies quality relative
to the socially optimal level:
• The smaller the advertising revenue from new users (Rq) compared to the
social value of new users (Uq) (this is just the classic social-private gap).
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• The greater the positive effect of quality on the utility of existing users’:
Uv (this increases the socially optimal level but leaves the monopoly level
unchanged).
• The greater the (negative) direct (‘substitution’ and ‘antagonism’) effect of
quality on the monopolist’s revenue: Rv (this decreases the monopolist’s cho-
sen quality but leaves the socially optimal level unchanged).
Overall, it is likely, in our view, that the under-provision effect dominates. First,
the effect on utility of search engine quality is likely to be high and to grow at
least as fast if not faster than returns to revenue from users. Second, the fact that
the direct effect of quality on revenue is likely to be negative. Third, and least
importantly, search engines have to bear advertising related costs which increase
their costs compared to the direct funding case and therefore reduce the quality
provided. The first of these effects is just the classic ‘social-private’ gap: the benefits
of an extra unit of search quality to society are less than those extracted (in the
form of advertising revenues). The second of the effects, which has already been
discussed at length, arises from the fact that, for those users a search engine already
has, quality acts as substitute for advertising (which is what the search engine is
ultimately concerned with). Note that this second effect, unlike the first one, is
not a general one but is likely to primarily affect quality in areas where it is more
directly antagonistic to, or a substitute for, advertising. Thus, it is likely more to
‘distort’ quality rather than unilaterally reduce it and for this reason we term it the
‘distortion’ effect.
7. Regulation
Does Internet search require regulation – whether now or in the future? Search
today is a huge business and the choices made by the primary companies involved,
particularly in how to rank results and what adverts to display, affect the lives of
everyone who uses the Internet. While some argue that search requires no regulation
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and that any such regulation would unnecessarily impede the rapid technological
progress of the industry; others have voiced concerns both about the informational
integrity of search engines and the potential misuse of the vast power accumulating
in commercial hands – a power to shape the information we discover and use. Clearly
one cannot address every single one of the concerns that have been voiced in a single
paper such as this. However, we have been able to provide a parsimonious framework
which allows us to address many of the main issues in a simple but rigorous way.
In particular, we have demonstrated why the search engine market is so concen-
trated and why it is likely to become more so (converging to monopoly or almost
monopoly). It therefore seems unlikely that one can simply rely on ‘competition’ to
avoid the need for regulatory engagement.
Once explicitly considering a monopoly (or close-to-monopoly) situation, our next
step, and the more important from a regulatory point of view, was to investigate
the ways in which a monopolist in the search market is likely to behave in ways that
are not socially optimal. This investigation is doubly important here. The structure
of the search market, in particular the zero price faced by search engine users, often
gives the misleading impression that a monopoly in the search engine market would
not result in negative consequences in the way that it would in other markets where
monopoly is explicitly associated with higher prices. This is not correct. Costs still
exist here but they are indirect, operating either via the search engines charges to
advertisers or via the quality of the service the search engine chooses to operate.
The model presented allowed us to reduce welfare comparisons to a comparison
of search engine quality, v. It was shown that monopoly could result in both over
provision and under provision of quality. However, as discussed, it is likely that
the under-provision effect dominates. This was primarily attributable to two main
factors: the ‘social-private’ gap and the ‘distortion’ effect.
What can a regulator can do with regard to the first of these factors, the ‘social-
private’ gap? In some ways the options are limited. After all they cannot mandate
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higher expenditures by private search engines and while government subsidies are
a possibility they tend to bring with them a host of difficult issues: who should be
awarded money; could such awards be anti-competitive if directed to a particular
firm etc. If this route were to be pursued one would probably need to focus on
funding basic R&D which was then made available to all firms.
Another possibility, along similar lines, but which avoids some of the difficulties,
would be the provision of a computing grid and search index upon which developers
could try out different algorithms. This option points towards the fact that the pro-
vision of a search engine divides (imperfectly) into what we could term the ‘software’
provision and the ‘service’ provision. The ‘software’ includes all the main software
used to run the system, including the ranking algorithm. The ‘service’ side involves
all the infrastructure, data-centres, support systems etc, which run the software and
actually respond to users’ queries. Obviously there is some degree of interaction
between these two – for example developing the software requires feedback and data
from actual usage, but it is also possible that the two sides could be separated to
some degree. This is important because the costs involved in algorithm develop-
ment could be much smaller than the large fixed costs of infrastructure – though in
the long run it may be the algorithm, extensively developed via learning-by-doing
etc, that provides the real barrier to entry. Thus, decoupling the two, might allow
for greater competition, innovation, and perhaps most importantly, transparency
on the ‘software’ side while on the ‘service’ side there remains a monopoly or near
monopoly (provided by the Government or a neutral, regulated, third-party). This
would be similar to a situation in many other industries where there exists a key
piece of infrastructure which for technology and costs reasons is a natural monopoly.
For example, in electricity supply the underlying transmission network is a natural
monopoly (and hence regulated) but competition is clearly possible in generation
(and hence is less regulated). Similarly in telecommunications it will be usual for
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the ‘local loop’ to be a natural monopoly (and hence regulated) but for there to
competition in service provision (telephony, broadband etc) over that ‘local loop’.
Such an approach in which there was a division, at least from a regulatory point
of view, between ‘software’ and ‘service’ would have more general benefits than
allowing targeted support. First competition in ‘software’ would increase spending
and therefore quality (the zero-profits equilibrium involves higher quality than the
profit-maximizing equilibrium). Second, and relatedly, it would reduce the risk of
long-term lock-in to a single provider. Third, regulatory attention could be focused
on the ‘service’ side which in many ways is simpler: economies of scale arise less from
(field-specific) innovation and R&D and more from fixed costs of infrastructure.
Let us now turn to the second factor mentioned, the ‘distortion’ effect. First
observe that the division of ‘software’ and ‘service’ would result in greater trans-
parency and competition on the ‘software’ side which greatly assist in reducing the
‘distortion’ effect. However, there are other ways of dealing with this problem with-
out taking such a major step. ‘Distortion’ could be handled, for example, by greater
monitoring of search results and their relation to advertisements. Relatedly, the
regulator could request confidential access to the search engine’s ranking algorithm
and could also act as a review panel for those who wish to ‘appeal’ their ranking.56
Similarly, such a regulator might also monitor the other, advertising side of search
engine activities, not only in the area of advertising content but also in relation to
issues such as click-fraud.
To sum up, there are both the grounds and the means for greater regulatory
oversight of search engines’ activities – be such oversight formal or informal. There
are a variety of ways such regulatory intervention could proceed. The most major,
but also perhaps the most effective, would involve dividing search engine provision,
56At present all major search engines, while providing facilities with which to raise complaints,
claim complete discretion in resolving any disputes over ranking. This is unlikely to prove sus-
tainable into a future in which search engines are both increasingly important, powerful, and
concentrated.
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whether conceptually or actually, into two separate ‘software’ and ‘service’ com-
ponents. Less dramatically it seems clear that as the power of search engines grow
there will be a increasing need for independent monitoring of the quality and content
of search engine results together with a body able to deal with complaints regarding
search engine rankings.
8. Conclusion
This paper has provided a comprehensive introduction and analysis of the search
engine market. After a basic overview of the nature of search engines, their current
importance, both commercially and socially, and their history we turned to the main
empirical and theoretical questions that animate our investigation: the current and
future market structure of the search engine market and its implications for societal
welfare.
Our empirical material demonstrated how the concentration of the search engine
market has grown over time and has now reached very substantial levels though with
some significant and important variation across market segments. This also formed
the background for the theoretical investigations that followed and which form the
core of this paper.
This theoretical work provides what is, to our knowledge, the first formal analy-
sis of the wider search engine market and its welfare implications.57 The first step
involved developing a basic model which captured the main features of the search
market, in particular the ‘implied revenue’ function which gives search engine rev-
enue as a function of users. The value of a user here is not, as in a normal case, the
revenue from a direct charge to that user but is the implied value arising from the
advertising revenue that user generates. Following on from this, we showed how the
structure of the search engine market, in particular that users care about quality
but are not charged, while advertisers care about users and are charged, explains
57By contrast there has already been substantial work on particular aspects of search engines such
as their methods for auctioning advertising space (see references in the main text).
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the highly concentrated nature of the search engine market and make it probable
that the market will continue to evolve down this path towards monopoly.
Given this, the next step was to investigate the welfare performance of a monopoly,
measured by the quality of search provided, as compared to the benchmark of the
socially optimal provision. It was shown that monopoly could deviate from optimal
provision in a variety of ways, including both under-provision and over-provision of
quality (associated in the first case with ‘distortion’ of search results provided). The
final section therefore considered possible ways a regulator might wish to intervene
particularly if the regulator were informationally or politically constrained in their
choices.
In summary: it seems clear that some form of oversight, possibly including some
form of formal regulation. Part of this effort could include taking steps to encourage
a more diverse search environment. However, the structure of the search market, in
particular its great economies of scale, may undermine the potential for, and benefits
of, vigorous market competition, especially in the long run. When monopoly, or
near monopoly, does obtain it was shown that there is no guarantee that the private
interests of a search engine and the interests of society as whole will coincide – and
good reasons to think otherwise. It is therefore likely that search, if left entirely
unregulated, will develop in ways that are not always to the benefit of society as a
whole. For this reason it is important that policy-makers start now on the process
of developing their strategy in relation to this key area of the knowledge economy.
The power rapidly accumulating in the hands of a few major search providers is a
great one. It behoves to ensure that it is used in a way that brings the greatest
benefit to society as a whole.
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